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Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by Rosemary Cakmis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The sentencing decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in 2014 focused on United States Sentencing Guidelines
(USSG, or the Guidelines) enhancements applied in connection with
economic, drug, immigration, firearm, and sex-related offenses.1 This
Survey first discusses the precedential decisions dealing with enhancements that only apply to a specific type of offense, such as an economic,
drug, or sex-related offense, and are found in Chapter Two of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the Guidelines Manual). Next,
this Survey examines decisions reviewing the "Adjustments" in Chapter
Three of the Guidelines Manual,which apply to any type of offense. The
Survey then discusses decisions regarding assorted enhancements that

* Senior Litigator, Office of the Federal Defender, Middle District of Florida. University
of Florida (B.S., 1979; J.D., 1981). Member, State Bar of Florida; Board Certified, Criminal
Appeals, State Bar of Florida.
1. For an analysis of Eleventh Circuit decisions from 2013 construing the Guidelines,
see Rosemary Cakmis, FederalSentencing Guidelines,Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 65 MERCER
L. REV. 971 (2014).
Notably, the United States Sentencing Commission (the Sentencing Commission) reports
that those offenses account for the bulk of the sentences imposed within the Eleventh
Circuit and nationally. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, Statistical Information
Packet, Fiscal Year 2013, Eleventh Circuit, at 1 (2013) availableat http://www.ussc.gov/res
earch-and-publicatons/federal-sentecing-statistics/federal-sentencing-statistics-state-districtcircuit-state/federal-sentencing-statistics-2013.
The Eleventh Circuit decisions published in 2014 relied on various editions of the
GuidelinesManual, depending on which edition the sentencing court used in the particular
case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(aX4)(AXii) (2014) (requiring that sentencing courts use the
Guidelines Manual that is in effect when the defendant is sentenced); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (same). To maintain consistency and ease of reference,
unless the guideline provision has changed substantively, all sentencing guideline
provisions cited in this Survey refer to the section numbers designated in the current
edition of the Guidelines Manual effective on November 1, 2014.
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are based on prior convictions for controlled-substance offenses and
crimes of violence. Those enhancements are contained in the specificoffense characteristics for immigration and firearm offenses in Chapter
Two of the Guidelines Manual, as well as in the criminal history
enhancements for certain drug, firearm, and violent offenses set forth in
Chapter Four. Finally, the Survey summarizes decisions involving
departures and variances.
II.

ENHANCEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC OFFENSES

Chapter Two, Part B of the GuidelinesManual2 contains the primaryoffense guidelines and specific-offense characteristics for 'Basic Economic
Offenses" like fraud, theft, and robbery. 3 Some of the enhancements in
Part B, however, also apply to economic offenses addressed in other
parts of the Guidelines Manual. For example, the money laundering
guideline applied in United States v. Campbell4 increases the base
offense level by the number of levels from the loss table in USSG6
§ 2Bl.l(bXl) 5 corresponding to the value of the laundered money.7
Similarly, the bribery guideline applied in United States v. Esquenazi
enhances the base offense level by the number of levels from the loss
table corresponding to the value of the payment, the benefit received, or
the government's loss.8
A.

Enhancement for Amount of Loss
"Under the Sentencing Guidelines' approach to economic crime," the
Eleventh Circuit explained in Campbell, "the amount of financial loss
attributable to a defendant's crime serves as a proxy for 'the seriousness
of the offense and the defendant's relative culpability."' 9 The loss table
contained in § 2B1.1(bX1), thus, is often the predominant factor in
calculating sentences for economic offenses.
The loss table is fairly straightforward. The loss amount is simply
plugged into the table to determine how many levels are added to the

2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2, pt. B, introductory cmt.
3. 765 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2S1.1(9X2) (2014)).
4. 765 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014).
5. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1).
6. See 765 F.3d at 1296 & n.3.
7. 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2C1.1(bX2).
8. See 752 F.3d at 936; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1(bX2).
9. 765 F.3d at 1301 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt.
background).
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base offense level. 10 The difficulties arise when calculating the loss
amount attributable to individuals engaged in complex schemes
involving various types of crimes.'
Subject to certain exclusions and credits, the commentary to § 2B1.1(b)(1) defines "loss" as "the greater of actual loss or intended loss."1"
Alternately, the sentencing court must measure the loss by "the gain
that resulted from the offense" when a loss actually occurred "but it
reasonably cannot be determined." 3 Recognizing that "the appropriate
method" to calculate loss in any given case is "highly fact-dependent," 4
the Eleventh Circuit published several decisions in 2014 expounding on
the multiple layers of general principles that guide a sentencing court's
loss calculations.
In United States v. Isaacson,5 for instance, several conspirators
devised and executed "a complex scheme designed to defraud investors
through a group of hedge funds."" After a few years, the auditors of
the hedge funds became suspicious, prompting the conspirators to recruit
the defendant to assist in preparing inflated valuations of the hedge
funds' assets to placate the auditors. As a result, 7the defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud.'
At sentencing, the defendant objected to the § 2B1.1(b)(1) loss
enhancement that was based on an investment in the hedge funds."i
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
"defined [the defendant's] agreement to participate in the conspiracy
narrowly, as a conspiracy to defraud the auditors." 9 In overruling the
defendant's objection, however, the sentencing court "concluded that by

10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 727 (11th Cir. 2014) ("The
Sentencing Guidelines do not require a precise determination of loss," and that the
sentencing court "need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available
information") (quoting United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Campbell, 765 F.3d at 1301 (commenting that "[iraud
is conjured in numerous variations" and further stating, "Given the nature of such crimes,
the financial damage done may often be difficult to calculate with precision; accordingly,
the Sentencing Guidelines only require district courts to make 'a reasonable estimate of the
loss.'") (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C) and United
States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1199 (11th Cir. 2006)).
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A).
13. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B).
14. Campbell, 765 F.3d at 1301.
15. 752 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014).
16. Id. at 1295.
17. Id. at 1296-97.
18. Id. at 1297.
19. Id.
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defrauding the auditors, Mr. Isaacson participated in the broader
conspiracy that caused [the investor] to make its investment."2 ° The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed. 2
The Eleventh Circuit explained that "a defendant is responsible for the
conduct of his co-conspirators only if that conduct was 'in furtherance of
the jointly undertaken criminal activity' and 'reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity.'"22 The sentencing court
therefore must first "make individualized findings concerning the scope
of criminal activity undertaken by a particular defendant."28 Then, the
court must determine whether the co-conspirators' acts were "in
furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the
criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant."'
The determinative factor in Isaacson was the sentencing court's
finding that the scope of activity undertaken by the defendant was5
limited to the conspiracy to defraud the auditors, not the investors.
Based on that finding, the defendant could only be held accountable for
the loss resulting from the acts of himself or his co-conspirators that
were "taken to defraud the auditors."2 The record, however, did not
support the conclusion that the investment loss "resulted from" the
conspiracy to defraud the auditors. 27 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that
the sentencing court clearly erred in basing that conclusion on "a
number of inferential leaps and assumptions not supported by the
record."2" Because the challenged loss was not within "the scope of
criminal activity undertaken" by the defendant, the Eleventh Circuit
vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. 29 The
court limited the scope of the resentencing on remand to the record the
parties made on the objections at the original sentencing. 80
Relying on the same general principles discussed in Isaacson, in
United States v. Baldwin"'the Eleventh Circuit rejected challenges to

20. Id.
21. Id. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1305 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.3 cmt. n.2).
23. Id. (quoting United States v. Hunter, 323 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003)).
24. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2).
25. Id. at 1305-06.
26. Id. at 1306.
27. Id. at 1307; see also id. at 1306-07 (rejecting the government's "hypothetical causal
chain" linking the loss and the conspiracy to defraud the auditors because it required
"inference upon inference for which there is not sufficient support in the record").
28. Id. at 1307.
29. Id. at 1305, 1308.
30. Id. at 1308.
31. 774 F.3d 711 (11th Cir. 2014).
22.
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loss calculations based on acts by co-conspirators.32 The defendants in
Baldwin appealed their sentences for assorted crimes arising from a
"scheme involving the unauthorized use of personal identifying
information to claim fraudulent tax refunds, which were deposited onto
debit cards opened in the names of identity theft victims."3
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sentencing court's determination
that each defendant was accountable for the total amount of fraudulent
tax refunds requested during the conspiracy, despite the sentencing
court's failure to articulate specific findings concerning the scope of
criminal activity each defendant agreed to jointly undertake.3 That
failure, the Eleventh Circuit explained, did not require vacatur of the
sentences because the record supported the sentencing court's determination.3"
Additionally, in Baldwin, the Eleventh Circuit rejected one conspirator's argument that he could not be held responsible for the loss
associated with the fraudulent tax returns that were filed when he was
incarcerated because he could not participate in those acts.36 Noting
that incarceration does not, as a matter of law, "automatically trigger[]
withdrawal from a conspiracy" the Eleventh Circuit explained, "It was
foreseeable that the other members of the conspiracy would continue to
operate despite [the incarcerated conspirator's] absence." 7 Moreover,
the court observed, the conspirator resumed the criminal activity upon
his release from custody, thereby demonstrating that "he never ceased
to be a part of the overall conspiracy and is responsible for the losses
incurred during his incarceration. 3 s

32. Id. at 727-34; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1255-57 (11th Cir.

2014) (applying the same general principles to the particular facts of the case to affirm the
sentencing court's determination of the loss attributed to a defendant convicted of
conspiring to commit and committing mail and wire fraud).
33. 774 F.3d at 719. Those crimes included conspiracy to defraud the government by
obtaining payments for false claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286 (2012); conspiracy to
use unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2) (2012); possession
and use of unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2) and (aX3)
(2012); and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(aXl) (2012);
Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 719-20.

34. See Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 727, 732, 733-34.
35. See id. at 727-34. For these same reasons, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected one
of the defendant's argument that he was not sufficiently involved in the conspiracy to be
held responsible for his co-conspirators' actions that gave rise to the enhancement for the
production or trafficking of access devices. Id. at 728.
36. See id. at 733-34.
37. Id. at 734 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1427 (11th Cir.
1991)).
38. Id.

996

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

The defendants in Esquenazi were convicted on multiple counts
charging conspiracies to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,3 9 to
commit wire fraud, and to launder money, as well as substantive
violations of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956.40 Pursuant to
§ 2C1.1(b)(2), their sentences were enhanced by the number of levels
from the loss table in § 2B1.1(bX1) corresponding to the value of "the
benefit received or to be received in return for the payment" of a
bribe.4'
On appeal, the defendants argued that "the value of 'the benefit
received' should be the value they each received individually," as opposed
to the total value received by the company they owned and operated in
connection with the charged offenses.42 Because that argument was not
presented to the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, it
was relegated to plain error review. 43 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that "nothing in our case law makes any error in this case plain.""
Hence, the court affirmed the sentences based on the total value received
by the company.45
The defendant in Campbell appealed his sentence after being convicted
on ninety-six counts charging various fraud, money laundering, and
conspiracy offenses related to a scheme to defraud the State of Alabama.
The defendant and his co-conspirators had created a non-profit
corporation through which state funds were funneled into the conspirators' accounts. The loss calculations were based on the premise that all
the money the non-profit corporation received constituted a loss to the
State of Alabama, but that loss amount was then decreased by twenty
percent to account for the funds properly distributed to the state.46 The
resulting appeal presented "a factual dispute over the legitimacy of the
[non-profit corporation] and a legal dispute over what the Government
is required to prove in order to establish a loss amount under § 2B1.1(b)"

(1). 47

39.

Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15

U.S.C.).
40. 752 F.3d at 917, 919; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
41. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 936 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2C1.1(b)(2) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42. Id. at 937; see also id. at 917-20 (detailing the complicated facts underlying the
charges).
43. Id. at 937.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 937, 939.
Campbell, 765 F.3d at 1294-97.
Id. at 1302.
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The Eleventh Circuit resolved the factual dispute based on the record,
which established that the non-profit corporation was a "sham organization" that "served no legitimate purpose."48 The actual loss, therefore,
could be reasonably determined, and the court rejected the defendant's
argument that the loss should be measured by "the gain that resulted
from the offense."49
Turning to the legal dispute, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the
defendant's claim that the government was required to prove that each
of the non-profit corporation's expenditures were illegitimate.50 Cases
that are similar to Campbell's, the court explained, the government's
burden to prove the loss by "reliable and specific evidence" 51 does not
require it to "sift through years of bank records and receipts to ascertain
itemized proof of every single transaction that should be chalked up as
a loss to the victim." 52 Further, the court concluded, "Where, as here,
a defendant's conduct was permeated with fraud, a district court does
not err by treating the amount that was transferred from the victim to
the fraudulent enterprise as the starting point for calculating the
victim's pecuniary harm."53
Having rejected the defendant's challenge to the sentencing court's loss
calculations, the Eleventh Circuit next considered the defendant's
argument that the costs associated with running the non-profit
corporation should have been credited against the loss. 4 The commentary to § 2B1.1 allows for a reduction in the loss amount for "money
returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the
services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with
the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected." 5 The
Eleventh Circuit stated, however, that the defendant was not entitled to
a credit for the non-profit corporation's operating expenses simply
"because they are appropriate expenses incurred in operating a
nonprofit." 6 Rather, the court explained, 'The relevant inquiry is
whether any legitimate value was rendered to the State of Alabama."'
The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed the sentencing court's declination to

48.
49.
n.3(B).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1299, 1304; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt.
Campbell, 765 F.3d at 1304.
Id. (quoting United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1370 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id. at 1305-06.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E).
765 F.3d at 1305.
Id.
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credit the loss amount with the expenses that "played some role in
perpetuating the scheme and the crime against the state."58
In United States v. Massam,59 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
Guidelines Manual's commentary on credits in the context of intended
loss. 0 The defendant in Massam set up pension plans for himself and
his employees, and then attempted to transfer all of the funds from the
pension plans into his foreign bank account. Although that transfer
failed, he ultimately stole about $.5 million from the pension plans. After
he pleaded guilty to theft and embezzlement, his guidelines were
calculated based on the intended loss, namely, the full amount of the
pension plan funds he unsuccessfully attempted to transfer into his
foreign bank account. On appeal, he challenged the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida's refusal to credit that loss amount with the
money he had been ordered to pay his ex-wife. That money was paid
from the supersedeas bond he posted to appeal his divorce judgment,
which required him to pay his ex-wife a portion of the pension funds.61
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that as a matter of law the defendant was
not entitled to the credit.6 The decisive factor for the court was that
the defendant was held accountable for intended loss, not actual loss."
The court explained by pointing to various application notes in the
commentary to § 2B1.1.64
First, the court noted the application note for "Credits Against Loss"
under § 2B1.1(bX1) provides that one measure of the allowable credit is
the "money ...returned 'to the victim."'6 5 Next, the court relied on the
application note for "Definitions," which provides, in part, that a victim
is "any person who sustained any part of the actual loss determined

58. Id. at 1305-06 (quoting Sent. Tr., doc. 123, at 66) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59. 751 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2014).
60. See id. at 1233.
61. Id. at 1230-32. The sentencing court credited that amount with the funds left in
pension accounts and with funds the defendant had invested on behalf of the pension plans
and lost because he was the victim of an illegal "Ponzi" scheme. Id. at 1231-32.Those
credits were not appealed. Id. at 1234.
62. Id. at 1234. The court's ruling made it unnecessary to resolve the ancillary question
whether a payment from a supersedeas bond qualified as returning money "by the
defendant or by one acting jointly with the defendant." Id. at 1234 n.5 (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(EXi) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
63. Id. at 1233.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(EXi) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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under subsection (b)(1)."66 Finally, the court pointed out, the application
note for "actual loss" defines "actual loss" as "the reasonably foreseeable
pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense." 7 The culmination of
those application notes, the court expounded, is that "a credit against
loss requires a 'victim,' which requires an actual loss, which does not
exist when there is only intended loss."6" The court announced that
intended loss cannot be reduced by money returned to a victim,
commenting,
"A thief cannot return money that he never succeeded in
69
stealing.
B.

Enhancement for Number of Victims

The meaning of "victim" is also important for purposes of § 2B1. 1(bX2),
which provides for two, four, or six additional offense levels depending
on the number of victims involved in the offense. The commentary to
§ 2B1.1, defining "victim" as a "person who sustained any part of the
actual loss," further defines "person" as including "individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies." 71 The application note for "Cases Involving Means of
Identification" adds to that definition "any individual whose means of
identification was used unlawfully or without authority."7 2 Additional
commentary explains that "such means of identification shall be of an
actual (i.e., not fictitious) individual, other than the defendant. . .. "
In Baldwin, one defendant argued on appeal that the government had
failed to prove the conspiracy affected 250 or more victims, which would
trigger the six-level enhancement, 74 "because [the government] did not
establish precisely how many tax returns contributed to the actual
loss.""5 In affirming the enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
the undisputed facts in the presentence report indicated the conspirators
filed more than 500 tax returns with stolen identity information. 6
Relying on a similar case from 2013,7 the Eleventh Circuit stated that
"based on common sense and ordinary human experience," the sentenc-

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1).
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(AXi)).
Id.
Id.

70.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(2).

71.

Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1.

72.
73.

Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E).
Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1.

74. See id. § 2B1. 1(bX2)(C).
75.
76.
77.

Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 735.
Id.; see also supra note 33.
United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2013).
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ing court "reasonably could infer... that the [Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)] verifies identifying information, like Social Security numbers,
before issuing a tax refund."7" "Further," the court posited, "the fact
that the [IRS] paid the refunds .. . indicates that the Social Security
numbers used to procure those refunds [were] associated with real
people."7 9 The Eleventh Circuit thus ruled that the sentencing court did
not clearly err in determining "more than 250 victims' identities were
used unlawfully or without their authority" because "the identifying
used to file 500-plus tax returns matched actual individuinformation
80
als.
In United States v.Rodriguez,"' the Eleventh Circuit applied the
plain error standard of review because, at sentencing, the defendant
failed to challenge the two-level enhancement for offenses involving ten
or more victims.8 2 The defendant also failed to object to the facts in the
presentence report.' The Eleventh Circuit thus considered those facts
to be admitted, including the statement that at least twenty-three
lenders funded the fraudulent transactions." As a consequence, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded, the defendant "effectively admitted that
there were twenty-three lender victims." 5 In ruling that the application
of the multi-victim enhancement was not plainly erroneous, the Eleventh
Circuit also summarily rejected as "contrary to law" the defendant's
claim that only the persons she owed restitution to could be considered
victims for purposes of the guideline enhancement. 86
C. Enhancement for Violating a Prior Court Order
7
the Eleventh Circuit resolved a
In United States v. Mathauda,"
question of first impression concerning the "knowing" requirement for
the two-level enhancement based on fraud committed in knowing

78.
79.
80.
81.

Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 735 (quoting Philidor,717 F.3d at 885-86).
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Philidor,717 F.3d at 886).
Id.
751 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2014).

82. Id. at 1257; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(bX2)(AXi).

83. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1257.
84. See id. at 1248 n.1, 1257-58.
85. Id. at 1257. Although the defendant's failure to object relieved the government of

the need to present evidence specifically identifying the victims at sentencing, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the government had submitted evidence that "more than ten lenders,
servicers, or loan holders were involved in the fraudulent loans attributed to [the
defendant]." Id.
86. Id. at 1257-58.
87. 740 F.3d 565 (l1th Cir. 2014).
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violation of a prior specific judicial order." The defendant argued he
did not knowingly violate the prior order because although he had been
served with a complaint, "he did not know his attorney failed to respond,
that default judgment was eventually entered, and that he had been
judicially ordered to cease his fraudulent activity." 9 The government
countered that the defendant was "willfully blind to the court's order,"
and because willful blindness equates to knowledge, the defendant
knowingly violated the prior order.90
The Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant's "willful blindness" of a
prior order can satisfy the knowing requirement for the enhancement
based on fraud committed in contravention of a prior judicial order.91
The standard for determining whether a defendant was "Willfully blind,"
the court announced, is whether the "defendant purposely contrived to
avoid learning all the facts, or the defendant was aware of a high
probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that
fact." 2 Considering the facts under that new standard, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that the government failed to carry its burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was willfully
93
The court vacated the sentence and
blind to the prior court order.
94
remanded for resentencing.
D.

Enhancement for SophisticatedMeans

The Eleventh Circuit gave the "sophisticated means" enhancement
under § 2BI.1(bXlO)(C)95 scant attention in 2014. The court affirmed
this enhancement in Rodriguez for basically the same reasons it affirmed
the § 2B1.1(b)(2XAXi) enhancement for more than ten victims.9 6 First,

88. Id. at 568; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BI.1(bX9)(C) ("If the
offense involved ...a violation of any prior, specific judicial or administrative order,
injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines... increase by 2
levels.. . ."); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.8(C) (requiring that the
defendant know of the prior order). This Guideline was found in § 2B1.l(b)(8)(C) of the
2010 edition of the Guidelines Manual, which the court relied on in United States v.
Mathauda. 740 F.3d 565, 566 n.2 (2014). In 2013, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2B1.1(b) was renumbered so that § 2BI.1(b)(8)(C) is now § 2B1.1(bX9)(C). Mathauda,740
F.3d at 566 n.2. This Survey refers to the enhancement and commentary as designated
in the 2014 edition of the Guidelines Manual.
89. Mathauda, 740 F.3d at 567.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 568-69.
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Bisong, 645 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
93. Id. at 569.
94. Id.
95. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BI.1(bX1O)(C).
96. See 751 F.3d at 1258; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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the court reviewed the guideline commentary, which defines "sophisticated means" as "especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct
pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense."97 The
commentary further provides, "Conduct such as hiding assets or
transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate
shells, or offshore financial accounts also ordinarily indicates sophisticated means. "
Turning to the facts, the court noted that the defendant had not
objected to the presentence report, which indicated the defendant
"participated in a scheme that utilized straw buyers, fraudulent
mortgage documents, fake title corporations, as well as the improper
diversion of the U.S. mail."99 Accepting the lack of objection to those
facts as an admission by the defendant,'0 0 the Eleventh Circuit
summarily concluded the district court did not plainly err in applying
the sophisticated means enhancement. 01'
Enhancement for Device-Making Equipment
Section 2B1. 1(bX 11) contains a multifaceted enhancement for certain
offense conduct involving device-making equipment, unauthorized access
devices, or means of identification. 10 2 The misapplication of that
enhancement in United States v. Charles °3 compelled the Eleventh
Circuit to vacate the defendant's sentence for conspiring to use
unauthorized access devices with intent to defraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) and (bX2).'04

E.

97. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1258 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2B1.1 cmt n.9(B)).
98.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §

2B1.1 cmt. 9(B).

99. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1258.
100. See id. at 1248 n.1.
101. Id. at 1258.
102. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B)). § 2BI.I(bXll)
provides:
If the offense involved (A) the possession or use of any (i) device-making

equipment, or (ii) authentication feature; (B) the production or trafficking of any
(i) unauthorized access device or counterfeit access device, or (ii) authentication
feature; or (CXi) the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification
unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, or (ii) the
possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced
from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification, increase by 2

levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to level 12.
Id.
103. 757 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2014).
104. Id. at 1223; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(aX2), (bX2X2012).
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The District Court for the Southern District of Florida had applied the
two-level enhancement for offenses involving "the production or
trafficking of any... unauthorized access device," pursuant to § 2BI.1(bXll)(BXi), based on its finding that the defendant transferred an
access device-a prepaid debit card-in connection with the conspiracy."05 The defendant, however, was also convicted of and sentenced for
aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A."° The commentary
to the identity theft guideline instructs that if a sentence for identity
theft is imposed "in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying
offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for the transfer,
possession, or use of a means of identification when determining the
sentence for the underlying offense."107
To determine whether the conspiracy in Charles was the predicate for
the aggravated identity theft conviction, the Eleventh Circuit relied on
United States v. Cruz, °8 which held that "convictions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(aX2) for defrauding by using an unauthorized access device are
predicate offenses for § 1028A purposes." 9 The court thus concluded
that just as violating § 1029(a)(2) was the predicate in Cruz, conspiring
to violate § 1029(aX2) was a predicate offense in Charles."' Accordingly, the court resolved Charles based on the dicta in Cruz that "when a
defendant receives the two-year consecutive sentence on the [aggravated]
identity theft count [under § 1028A1, h[is] sentence for any underlying

105. 757 F.3d at 1224, 1225, 1226 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2B1.I(bXl1XB)(i)).
106. Id. at 1224, 1226; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2012). The aggravated identity theft
statute mandates a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(aX1),
and the applicable guideline, provides that "the guideline sentence is the term of
imprisonment required by statute." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.6.
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2. In its entirety, that
commentary states:

If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for
an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for the
transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification when determining the
sentence for the underlying offense. A sentence under this guideline accounts for
this factor for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is accountable
under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). "Means of identification" has the meaning given
that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1028(dX7)
(2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3.
108. 713 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, Cruz v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 213
(2013); see also Cakmis, supra note 1, at 984-86.
109. Charles, 757 F.3d at 1224 (quoting Cruz, 713 F.3d at 605).
110. Id.
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offense is not eligible for a 2-level increase for transfer, possession, or
use of false identification.""'
As a final matter, the Eleventh Circuit noted that in addition to the
"trafficking" of an unauthorized access device, the § 2B1.1(bXll)(BXi)
enhancement could be based on "the production" of such a device. 2
The identity theft guideline only refers to "transfer, possession, or use"
of the device; ergo, it should not preclude a § 2B1.1(bX11) enhancement
based on "production."1 The sentencing court, however, "ruled solely
on the 'trafficking' ground and declined to rule on the government's
'production' argument, leaving us without the benefit of the requisite fact
findings on this issue."' The Eleventh Circuit therefore directed the
sentencing court to 1address
the production issue on remand "based on
5
record."
current
the
F

Cross Reference

Section 2B1.1(cX3) provides that if a defendant was convicted under
a general fraud statute and the conduct described in the count of
conviction "establishes an offense specifically covered by another
guideline in Chapter Two," the court should apply the other guideline. 6 The commentary further explains that if the conviction is for
"an offense involving fraudulent conduct that is more aptly covered by
1
another guideline," the other guideline should be used."
Relying on that cross-reference, one defendant in Baldwin argued that
he should have been sentenced under the more lenient tax guideline in
Chapter Two, Part T of the Guidelines Manual.18 Although he had
pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining
payment for fraudulent claims, he asserted that the tax guideline more
appropriately covered his offense conduct concerning the submission of

111. Id. at 1226 (alteration in original) (quoting Cruz, 713 F.3d at 607). The court
explained, "This statement in Cruz would wholly resolve the issue here; however, we note
that it is dicta because Cruz did not involve an increase for 'trafficking.' Cruz involved the
possession of 'device-making equipment,' another ground for a two-level increase under
§ 2B1.1(bXll)." Id. at 1226 n.2.
112. Id. at 1227.
113. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2.
114. Charles,757 F.3d at 1227.
115. Id. In Baldwin, on the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit refused to consider one
defendant's challenge to the enhancement for the trafficking in unauthorized access devices
despite his separate sentence for aggravated identity theft because he did not object at

sentencing and he only raised the issue in his reply brief, as opposed to his initial brief.
774 F.3d at 730 n.1.
116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(cX3).
117.
118.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.16.
774 F.3d at 732; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2T.
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false claims for tax refunds."1 9 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting
that the "heart" of the defendant's scheme was not simply the filing of
fraudulent tax returns; rather, the defendant "unlawfully enriched
himself by stealing identities, defrauding the victims by filing false
returns, and obtaining and using fraudulent debit cards in the victims'
names to receive the fraudulent returns."120 The court thus concluded
aptly fit the specifics of the crimes"
that "the § 2B1.1 guidelines more
1 21
that the defendant committed.
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the defendant's argument that if
either section could cover the offense conduct, the rule of lenity required
application of the more lenient guideline. 2 2 The court explained that
even if both sections were applicable, "the guidelines provide a clear
solution."1 2 3 In such cases, § 1B1.1 directs the sentencing court to "use
the provision that results in the greater offense level."'"
G.

Injury Enhancement for Robbery

In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed several sentences imposed for
robbery offenses, but only analyzed a guideline enhancement under
2
' The bodily injury
§ 2B3.1(b) in United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra.1
12
enhancement in § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) was at issue there. ' The guidelines
or "of a type for
define "bodily injury" as either "painful and obvious"
" 127
which medical attention ordinarily would be sought.
The only support for the bodily injury enhancement in Aguilar-Ibarra
was a statement in the presentence report that an "employee suffered
minor injuries as result of being assaulted and was taken to the hospital

119. Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 732-33.
120. Id. at 733.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.5).
125. 740 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see also United States v. Dougherty,
754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014) (examining Chapter Three enhancements, upward variance,
and reasonableness of sentences for bank robbery); United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268
(11th Cir. 2014) (affirming substantive reasonableness of 1062-month sentence for robbery
and firearm convictions); United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2014)
(addressing statutory and constitutional aspects of mandatory life sentence for robbery and
firearm convictions).
126. Aguilar-Ibarra, 740 F.3d at 589. If "any victim sustained bodily injury,"
§ 2B3.1(bX3) provides graduated offense level enhancements according to the seriousness
of the injury. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(3).
127. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.1 cmt. n.l(B); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 cmt. n.1 (referring to U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.1 for the definition of "bodily injury").
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for those injuries." 12 That conclusory statement sufficed to increase

in light of Eleventh Circuit precedent concernthe defendant's sentence 129
ing appellate procedure.

The procedural obstacles in Aguilar-Ibarra included an untimely
objection to the enhancement and a failure to object to the facts in the
presentence report. In particular, defense counsel did not file written
objections to the presentence report within the fourteen-day period
specified in Rule 32(f)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 3 '
Counsel's objection to the enhancement at sentencing, therefore, was
untimely, relegating the issue to plain error review."'
Additionally, while counsel objected to the enhancement at sentencing,
arguing that the parties agreed there was no evidence of the nature or
extent of the victim's injury, counsel did not object to the facts in the
presentence report. 1 2 The conclusory statements in the presentence
report, therefore, were deemed admitted, and the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida could rely on them despite the lack of any
supporting evidence."' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded,
the sentencing court could reasonably infer from the statement that the
victim's injuries were either "painful and obvious" or "of a type for which
medical attention ordinarily would be sought," as the enhancement
requires.'34
III.

ENHANCEMENTS FOR DRUG OFFENSES

The Drug Quantity Table located at USSG § 2D1. 1(c) assigns the base
offense level for most drug offenses based on the type and quantity of
drugs involved in the offense."' The sentencing court's drug quantity
calculations, therefore, are the single most significant component of drug
sentences." 6 Those calculations take on added significance when the

128.

740 F.3d at 592.

129. Id.
Id. at 589, 592; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1).
Aguilar-Ibarra,740 F.3d at 592.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.l(B)).
135. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(aX5) (2014). If the offense of
conviction established that death or serious bodily injury resulted from using the drugs,
the base offense level is specified in U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(aX1)130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

(4).

136. The importance of the district court's drug quantity findings is highlighted in a
recent decision concerning the application of a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines
pertaining to cocaine base. In United States v. Green, 764 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014), the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of
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scale of the offense is not accurately represented by the amount of drugs
seized. In such cases, the Guidelines, as well as Eleventh Circuit
precedent,137 direct the sentencing court to "approximate" the drug
quantity.
While not broaching new ground concerning drug quantity approximations in 2014, United States v. Reeves' and United States v. Barsoum,'3 ' the Eleventh Circuit discussed the guiding principles. In both
cases, the Eleventh Circuit observed that the sentencing court's drug
quantity estimate must be "fair, accurate, and conservative" and that it
"may rely on evidence demonstrating the average frequency and amount
of a defendant's drug sales over a given period of time.""' The estimate, however, cannot be based on "mere speculation."'
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the drug quantity findings in
Reeves and in Barsoum were based on the sentencing courts '142 estimation of the average frequency and quantity of drugs distributed over the
relevant period, which in turn was based on evidence presented at trial
and sentencing. 143 Although Reeves and Barsoum involved different
facts, in each case the defendant argued that the sentencing court based
its estimate on testimony that was inconsistent or uncertain.'" Both
cases thus involved the sentencing court's "credibility determinations"

Florida's decision that the defendant was not eligible for a sentence reduction based on its
drug quantity findings. Id. at 1353-54. Given that the sentence reduction proceedings were
not 4 de novo resentencing, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it "must defer" to the district
couit's findings. Id. at 1356.
137. The commentary to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 provides:
Types and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be
considered in determining the offense level. Where there is no drug seizure or the
amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate
the quantity of the controlled substance. In making this determination, the court
may consider, for example, the price generally obtained for the controlled
substance, financial or other records, similar transactions in controlled substances
by the defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory involved.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Frazier, 89
F.3d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1996).
138. 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2014).
139. 763 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2014).
140. Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506 (quoting Almedina, 686 F.3d at 1316); see also Barsoum,
763 F.3d at 1333.
141. Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1333; Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506.
142. Reeves was an appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia, and Barsoum was an appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.
143. Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1335-36; Reeves, 742 F.3d at 507.
144. Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1332; Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506-07.
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about drug-quantity witnesses.145 Noting the "great deference" accorded to a sentencing court's credibility determination, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the sentences in both cases. 46 The court explained, "Where
evidence gives rise to two reasonable and different constructions, as
choice between the
conflicting witnesses' testimony may, the fact finder's
1 47
two constructions cannot be clearly erroneous."
IV.

ENHANCEMENTS FOR CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, ENTICEMENT, AND
SEX TRAFFICKING

Chapter Two, Part G of the Guidelines Manual contains multiple
enhancements, cross references, and special instructions for various
offenses relating to sex trafficking, as well as producing, possessing, or
distributing child pornography. 4 ' The Sentencing Commission has
criticized the child pornography Guidelines, as well as the current
federal statutory scheme related to child pornography offenses, in a
special report to Congress. 4" While that report provides significant
insight into the child pornography Guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit ruled
50
that the report did not alter the sentencin United States v. Cubero,1
ing court's duties concerning imposition of sentence or the appellate
court's review of the sentence.'5 1
Most of the other 2014 Eleventh Circuit decisions considered double
counting issues relating to various Guidelines in Part G. In United
States v. Mathis, 5 2 however, the court resolved an issue of first
impression concerning the meaning of "computer" that could have wide
ramifications.' 5 3
A.

Computer Enhancement

Section 2G2.1(bX6) provides a two-level enhancement for using a
"computer" to entice or solicit "a minor to engage in sexually explicit

145. Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1333; Reeves, 742 F.3d at 498.
146. Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1333, 1336 (quoting United States v. Greg, 179 F.3d 1312,
1316 (11th Cir. 1999)); Reeves, 742 F.3d at 507 (quoting Greg, 179 F.3d at 1316).
147. Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1333; see also Reeves, 742 F.3d at 507 ("Indeed, where there
are two acceptable views of the evidence, the factfmder's choice cannot be clearly
erroneous.").
148. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
149.

§ 2G.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES

(2012), available at httpJ/www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reportssex-

offense-topics/report-congress-federal-child-pornography-offenses.
150. 754 F.3d 888 (11th Cir. 2014).
151. Id. at 898-900.
152. 767 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2014).
153. See id. at 1282-84.
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conduct" for the purpose of producing child pornography.M In Mathis,
the defendant argued that his use of a cell phone to call the minor did
not qualify as "the use of a computer" in the meaning of § 2G2.1(b)(6). 1 5 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.156
The commentary to § 2G2.1 refers to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) 157 for the
definition of "computer."158 That statute, which criminalizes fraud and
related activities in connection with a computer, defines a "computer" as:
[ln electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed
data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage
functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications
facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device,
but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter,
a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device...."'
Observing that this definition does not require "that the device have a
connection to the Internet or Internet capabilities," the Eleventh Circuit
held that the definition is broad enough to encompass a smart phone
used to call and send text messages." The court pointed out, however,
that "not.. . every use of a device with a data processor necessarily
warrants imposition of an enhancement under § 2G2.1(bX6)."' 6 1
when the
Rather, the court cautioned, the enhancement only applies
" 16 2
minor.
a
with
directly
communicate
"to
used
is
device

154.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2G2.1(b)(6)

(2014). Section 2G2.1(bX6)

provides, in relevant part,
=xt

If, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material or for the purpose of transmitting
such material live, the offense involved... (B) the use of a computer... to (i) persuade,
induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit

conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in such conduct; or (ii) solicit
participation with a minor in sexually explicit conduct, increase by 2 levels.
Id.
155. Mathis, 767 F.3d at 1282-83.
156. Id. at 1283.
157. 18 U.S.C, § 1030(eXl) (2012).
158.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2G2.1

cmt. n.1.

159. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).
160. Mathis, 767 F.3d at 1283. Alternatively, the court stated, if the enhancement was

applied in error, the error was harmless because the defendant's guideline range was the
same with and without the enhancement. Id. at 1284.
161. Id. at 1283 n.12.
162. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1 cmat. n.4(B)).
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B.

Cross References and Double Counting
While the remainder of the Eleventh Circuit decisions on various
guidelines related to sex trafficking and child pornography offenses
presented unique facts, the legal issues in most of those appeals related
to cross references and double counting. As illustrated in United States
v. Flanders,' the Eleventh Circuit applied the general principles
underlying the prohibition on "impermissible double counting" to resolve
those legal issues."
In Flanders,the defendants were convicted of conspiracy and several
substantive sex trafficking charges, based on "a scheme in which they
fraudulently lured women to South Florida, drugged them..., filmed
them engaging in sexual acts, and distributed the pornographic
footage."'6 5 In appealing their life sentences, the defendants challenged
the application of the cross reference in § 2G1.1(cX1),1 6 which directs
the sentencing court to apply the criminal sexual abuse guideline in
§ 2A1.3 when "the offense involved" sexual abuse conduct "described in
18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b) or 18 U.S.C. § 2242. "167
As an initial matter, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed one defendant's
claim that the cross reference was inapplicable because he was convicted
of fraudulent inducement, not of committing a sex act.16 The court
explained that "the plain language of the cross reference states that it
should apply if the offense 'involved' § 2241 conduct,
not merely if the
169
§ 2241 conduct was the basis for the conviction."

163. 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014).
164. Id. at 1340 (United States v. Webb, 665 F.3d 1380, 1382 (11th Cir. 2012)).
165. Id. at 1325, 1327. One defendant also was convicted of drug distribution. Id. at
1325-26. Section 2G1. 1, "Promoting a Commercial Sex Act or Prohibited Sexual Conduct
with an Individual Other than a Minor," covers violations of sex crime statutes if the
offense involved a victim other than a minor. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2G1.1 cmt.
If the offense involved a minor, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.3,
"Promoting a Commercial Sex Act or Prohibited Sexual Conduct with a Minor; Transportation of Minors to Engage in a Commercial Sex Act or Prohibited Sexual Conduct; Travel
to Engage in Commercial Sex Act or Prohibited Sexual Conduct with a Minor; Sex
Trafficking of Children; Use of Interstate Facilities to Transport Information about a
Minor," applies. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.3 cmt.
166. 752 F.3d at 1339-40.
167. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.I(cX1); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a),
(b), 2242 (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.3.
168. Flanders,752 F.3d at 1339.
169. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit next rejected the other defendant's "double
counting" challenge to the cross reference. 70 In essence, the defendant
argued that because of the cross reference to § 2A1.3, "conduct described
in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b)" was double counted.' Specifically, the
defendant argued, that conduct was first counted to calculate his base
offense level under § 2A3.1(aX2), and then72counted again to enhance
that base offense level under § 2A3.1(b)(1).
Double counting is not permitted, the Eleventh Circuit explained,
"when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant's
punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully
accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines." 17 The
sentencing court may "double count" a factor, however, "if the Sentencing
Commission intended that result and each guideline section in question
concerns conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing. " "'
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the application of the § 2Gl.l(c)
cross reference in conjunction with the § 2A3.1(bXl) enhancement did
not constitute impermissible double counting. 178 The Sentencing
Commission intended those provisions to be applied together, the court
reasoned, given that under § 1B1.5(a), when a cross reference applies,
the entire referenced offense guideline, including enhancements, should
apply. 176 Moreover, the court expounded, "the cross reference and the
enhancement do not deal with identical conduct." 77 In particular, the
§ 2G1.1(cX1) cross reference applies to any conduct constituting sexual
abuse, while the § 2A3.1(bXl) enhancement only applies to "conduct
constituting the more severe subset of aggravated sexual abuse
offenses." 78
Similarly, in Cubero, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a double counting
challenge to the child pornography guideline. 179 The defendant in
Cubero was sentenced on one count of distributing child pornography
and two counts of possession of child pornography. The District Court for

170. Id. at 1339-40.
171. Id. at 1339.
172. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.1(a) (providing that the
base offense level is "(1) 38, if the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c); or
(2) 30, otherwise"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.1(bXl) (2014) ("If the
offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b), increase by 4 levels.").
173. Flanders,752 F.3d at 1340 (quoting Webb, 665 F.3d at 1382).
174. Id. (quoting Webb, 665 F.3d at 1382).
175. Id. at 1340.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 754 F.3d at 893-95.
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the Southern District of Florida applied the base offense level in
§ 2G2.2(a)(2) for "trafficking" in child pornography, instead of the lower
base offense level in § 2G2.2(a)(2) for simply possessing it, and then
applied the distribution enhancement in § 2G2.2(b)(3).'80
In rejecting the claim that § 2G2.2 impermissibly double counts
distribution, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the "act of distribution
was not 'fully accounted for' by application of the base offense level."1 s '
The court reasoned that the guideline covers various offenses, in addition
to distribution, and "draws many distinctions" to guide sentencing courts
in differentiating "the harm caused by" the various offenses." 2 In light
of the structure of § 2G2.2, the Eleventh Circuit opined that the
Sentencing Commission intended to address "the range of harms
...
associated with child pornography distribution
13

through various

offense level increases and decreases." 8
On a related note, in United States v. Grzybowicz,'" 4 the Eleventh
Circuit provided insight into the meaning of "distribution" relating to
child pornography." 5 The defendant there was convicted on charges of
sexual exploitation of a minor to produce child pornography, distribution
of child pornography, and possession of child pornography.8 6 The
Eleventh Circuit vacated the distribution conviction based on a legal
question of first impression concerning the meaning of "distribute" for
purposes of the statute criminalizing the distribution of child pornography.'87 The court held that for purposes of the distribution statute, the
distribution requires more than emailing child pornography to oneself. " Rather, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "distribution" requires
proof that the defendant "transferred child pornography to others or
'freely allowed them access to his computerized stash of images.'"'8 9
Because the Eleventh Circuit vacated the distribution conviction and
sentences in Grzybowicz, it was unnecessary for the court to resolve the
defendant's challenge to the distribution enhancement in § 2G2.2(b)-

180. Id. at 891. In addition to the § 2G2.2(bX3) distribution enhancement, the
defendant's sentence was enhanced based on four other specific offense characteristics in

§ 2G2.2(b). 754 F.3d at 891.
181. Cubero, 754 F.3d at 894.
182. Id. at 895.
183. Id.
184. 747 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2014).
185. See id. at 1307-09.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 1301, 1303.
Id. at 1307, 1310.
Id. at 1309.
Id. (quoting United States v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007)).
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In remanding for resentencing, however, the court pointed out
that the guideline definition of "distribution" is broader than the
statutory definition. 191 "That means our conclusion that the evidence was
insufficient to support [the defendant's] conviction for distribution...
application of the § 2G2.1(bX3)
does not necessarily foreclose 1 the
92
enhancement in his sentencing."
(3).190

V.

CHAPTER THREE ADJUSTMENTS

Unlike the specific offense characteristics in Chapter Two of the
Guidelines Manual, the "Adjustments" in Chapter Three are not limited
to a particular type of offense.' 93 In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the Adjustments related to the victim, the defendant's role, and
obstruction in the context of a variety of offenses.
A.

Aggravating and MitigatingRole Adjustments

In United States v. Salgado,' the Eleventh Circuit was faced with
a question of law concerning how to apply a role adjustment based on
Part B of Chapter Three when the defendant only had an aggravated
role in one of multiple offenses that are grouped under Part D of
Chapter Three. 195 The defendant in Salgado was convicted of drug and
money laundering offenses, and the drug offenses were "the underlying
offense[s] from which the laundered funds were derived."' Apparently
were grouped and the money
pursuant to § 3D1.2(c), the offenses
1
laundering guideline was used. 7
When an offense guideline determines the offense level by reference
to another offense, the "default" rule is that "the Chapter Three
adjustments are to be based on the guideline and rules for that other
offense." 9 ' That default rule, however, does not apply if another

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
745 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014).

MANUAL

ch. 3 (2014).

195. Id. at 1135-36; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, pt. D,
introductory cmt. ("This Part provides rules for determining a single offense level that
encompasses all the counts of which the defendant is convicted.").
196. Salgado, 645 F.3d at 1136-37 (alteration in original) (quoting US. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 cmt. n.6).
197.

See id. (noting the sentencing report's departure from § 3D1.2's procedure).
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.5(c) ("If the offense

198. Id. at 1138; see U.S. SENTENCING

level is determined by a reference to another guideline under subsection (a) or (b)(1) above,
the adjustments in Chapter Three (Adjustments) also are determined in respect to the
referenced offense guideline, except as otherwise expressly provided.").
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guideline expressly provides otherwise, and the money laundering
guideline does just that199

The money laundering guideline expressly instructs that "When setting
an offense level under § 2S1.1(aX), a court should make Chapter Three
adjustments based on the defendant's conduct in the money laundering
offense itself," not based on the conduct in the underlying offense that
produced the money.' Concluding that this Guideline commentary is
"straightforward," the Eleventh Circuit stated, "When the district court
calculated Salgado's offense level under § 2S 1.1(a)(1), it could base a role
enhancement on his conduct in the money laundering conspiracy but not
on his conduct in the underlying drug conspiracy."2 0 ' Because the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
misapplied the Guidelines by using the defendant's conduct in the
underlying drug conspiracy to impose a role enhancement when
calculating his adjusted offense level for money laundering, Eleventh
Circuit vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded the case for "the
resulting miscalculation20 2 [to] be laundered out of the sentence in a
resentence proceeding."

In several other appeals in 2014, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
challenges to the imposition of an aggravating role enhancement under
§ 3B1.1, as well as to the denial of a mitigating role reduction under
§ 3B1.2. Each of those decisions relied extensively on the text of the
Guidelines, Eleventh Circuit precedent interpreting that text, and the
specific facts of the case.2 °3
For example, a defendant in United States v. Esquenazi2 4 argued
that the sentencing court erred in applying the four-level "organizer or
leader" enhancement, and that "at most" he qualified for the three-level
"manager or supervisor" enhancement.2 5 The guideline commentary

199. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 cmt. n.2(c) ("Notwithstanding
§ B1.5(c), in cases in which [§ 2SI.1(aXl) applies, application of any Chapter Three
adjustment shall be determined based on the offense covered by this guideline (i.e., the
laundering of criminally derived funds) and not on the underlying offense from which the
laundered funds were derived.").
200. Salgado, 745 F,3d at 1138.
201. Id.; see also id. at 1138-39 (noting cases from the court's "sister circuits" that have
reached similar conclusions, including United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 328 (6th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d 789, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Byors, 586 F.3d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 440 F.3d 44,
49 (1st Cir. 2006)).
202. Id. at 1136, 1140.
203. See, e.g., Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711; Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912; Rodriguez, 751 F.3d
1244; United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014).
204. 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014).
205. 752 F.3d at 937; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1(b).
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provides several factors that distinguish those roles.0 6 Considering
many of those factors, the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida concluded that the defendant was "in charge" of the bribery,
served as "the boss" of certain co-conspirators, and "was in fact the
leader of the organization, and not just the president in name because
he actually participated in many of the decisions involving the bribery
scheme." 207
Given the "extensive testimony at trial about [the defendant's]
involvement in each step of the scheme," the Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court's factual findings were not clearly
erroneous.20 8 In affirming the four-level enhancement, the Eleventh
Circuit also observed the co-conspirators' roles did not change its
analysis given that the commentary specifically provides that "more than
"as a leader or organizer of a criminal associaone person" can qualify
209
tion or conspiracy."
In a similar vein, the Eleventh Circuit stated in United States v.
Stanley,"' "The fact that a defendant's role may be less than that of
other participants engaged in the relevant conduct may not be dispositive of role in the offense, since it is possible that none are minor or
minimal participants." 21 1 In Stanley, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia's refusal to apply the
minor-role reduction, relying on United States v. De Varon,2 12 the
controlling Eleventh Circuit authority concerning the minor-role
reduction. 13
The two-prong test for minor role under De Varon, the Eleventh
Circuit explained, first requires the court to "measure the defendant's
role against the relevant conduct for which [he] was held accountable at
sentencing," based on the activities and losses in which the defendant
participated.2 14 Second, the court "may also measure the defendant's

206. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4.
207. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 938 (quoting the district court) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4); see also
Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 734-35 (relying on that same commentary to affirm one defendant's
three-level "manager or supervisor" enhancement because the defendant's "factual proffer
accompanying his guilty plea indicates that he acted as a manager").
210. 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014).
211. Id. at 654 (quoting United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 944 (11th Cir. 1999)).
212. 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999).
213. Stanley, 739 F.3d at 633-35.
214. Id. at 654 (alteration in original) (quoting De Varon, 175 F.3d at 945).
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role against the other participants, to the extent that they are discernable, in that relevant conduct."215
Applying this test to the facts, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
sentencing court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was
not a minor participant.2 16 Contrary to the defendant's testimony, the
evidence established that the defendant "substantially participated in
and profited from" the securities fraud scheme for which he was
convicted and sentenced.2 17 Moreover, the defendant "played a key part
though his conduct was "not as
in the elaborate securities fraud" even
2 18
egregious" as that of a co-defendant.
In United States v. Rodriguez,2 9 the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida had sustained the defendant's objection to an
aggravating role enhancement, but denied her request for a minor role
reduction. 220 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the record
supported the sentencing court's finding that the defendant was not a
minor participant in the offense. 22' The court explained that the
sentencing court's finding that the defendant was not an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor for purposes of an aggravating role
enhancement did not "automatically" mean the defendant was a minor
or minimal participant for purposes of the mitigating role reduction.222
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit explained, the sentencing court
properly analyzed the defendant's role "by making an individualized
determination," as required by the guidelines. 223 The circuit court thus
rejected the defendant's argument that the sentencing court had
role reductions for
"improperly applied a categorical rule barring 22minor
4
defendants in large-scale fraud prosecutions."
B.

Immediate Flight and Reckless Endangerment Enhancements

The defendants in United States v. Dougherty225 appealed their 428month sentences for armed bank robbery on various grounds, including
an issue of first impression concerning the meaning of "immediate flight"

215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. (quoting De Varon, 175 F.3d at 945).
Id. at 653-55.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 655.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

751 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2014).
751 F.3d at 1249-50.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1258-60.
754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014).
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for purposes of USSG § 3A1.2(c).226 That Guideline provides a six-level
enhancement if the defendant, "in a manner creating a substantial risk
officer "during the
of serious bodily injury" assaulted a law enforcement 227
course of the offense or immediate flight therefrom."
In Dougherty, even though the assault occurred eight days after the
bank robbery, the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
reasoned that "continuous flight was equivalent to immediate flight and,
since the Defendants were continuously fleeing from the bank robbery
22
for eight days, the enhancement for immediate flight should apply."
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.2 29
Noting the absence of a definition for "immediate flight" in the
Guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit turned to dictionaries for the "ordinary
meaning" of that phrase. 2 0 The dictionary definitions for "immediate"
included "occurring without delay;" "instant"23' and "made or done at
once." 23 2 Based on those definitions, the court concluded, "the Defendants' assaults against the police officers in this case, occurring eight
days after, and thousands of miles and several states away from the
Georgia robbery, no matter how disturbing or egregious, do not meet the
ordinary meaning of the term 'immediate. '' 233 The Eleventh Circuit
therefore vacated the sentences of two defendants and remanded for
resentencing because the sentencing court "improperly applied" the sixlevel enhancement under § 3A1.2(c). 2 '
The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected the defendants' multifaceted
argument that the sentencing court erred in applying the two-level
enhancement under § 3C1.2 for "recklessly creat[ing] a substantial risk
of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of
fleeing from a law enforcement officer."2 35 Unlike the § 3A1.2(c)
enhancement, for purposes of the § 3C1.2 enhancement, the reckless
endangerment need not occur during "immediate flight" from the offense;
rather, § 3C1.2 only requires that the reckless conduct occur "in the

226. Id. at 1355, 1359; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.2(c).
227.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

3A1.2(c).

228. 754 F.3d at 1359.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231.

Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (7th ed. 1999)).

232. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1129 (unabridged

ed. 1986)).

233. Id.
234. Id. Although the same enhancement was applied in sentencing the third defendant
in Dougherty, he "waived his right to challenge the application of this enhancement"
because he did not appeal the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Id. at 1356.

235. Id. at 1359.
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course of fleeing." 236 The "during flight" requirement, the Eleventh
Circuit explained, "is construed broadly and is applicable where the
conduct occurs in the course of resisting arrest."2 7
While "a defendant cannot be held responsible for another's conduct
under § 3C1.2 without some form of direct or active participation," the
Eleventh Circuit declined to decide whether the reckless endangerment
enhancement could be applied to two defendants based on the danger
created by a third defendant's reckless driving.' The court explained
that the two defendants "personally engaged in conduct" that qualified
them for the enhancement, in that one defendant shot at law enforcement during the car chase, and the other defendant pointed a firearm at
an officer after the car crashed.239
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the defendants' argument that the
reckless endangerment enhancement could not be based upon their
possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of a firearm because they also
were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 40 The court explained
that "the § 924(c) conviction and the § 3C1.2 adjustment are based upon
different conduct."241 The defendants were convicted under § 924(c)
because they discharged a firearm while robbing the bank in Georgia,
and the § 3C1.2 enhancement was based on the defendants pointing a
firearm and shooting at officers in Colorado. 2
Further, the Eleventh Circuit explained, the defendants' reliance on
the commentary to the firearm Guideline was misplaced.2 43 That
commentary provides that where the defendant is convicted under
§ 924(c), the sentencing court may not "apply any specific offense
characteristic for possession, brandishing, use or discharge of any
explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying
offense." 2 ' The § 3C1.2 reckless endangerment enhancement, however,
is an obstruction adjustment, not a "specific offense characteristic" that

236. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.2.
237. Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1359 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 3C1.2 cmt. n.3).

238. Id. at 1360 (noting that the sentencing court is required to make "a specific finding
[]that the defendant actively caused or procured the reckless behavior at issue"(alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 2012)).

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
n.4).

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).
Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1360.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.4 cmt.
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The Eleventh Circuit thus

concluded that the sentencing court properly applied the reckless
endangerment enhancement.'
C.

Obstruction of Justice

The criterium for the two-level "obstruction of justice" enhancement,
under USSG § 3C1.1, is that
(1) the defendant willfully obstructed, or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant's offense of conviction, including relevant conduct; or (B) a closely
related offense.. ."
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the imposition of that enhancement in
2014 based on one defendant's perjury and another's attempted
escape.2s
The defendant in Esquenzal, testified at his trial and was convicted.
At sentencing, the district court applied the § 3C1.1 obstruction
enhancement based on the defendant's testimony, but it failed to make
findings on specific instances of perjury. 249 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed that the defendant was "right that, when applying an obstruction
enhancement, 'it is preferable for a district court to address each element
of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding.' 250 The sentencing court's failure to make such findings, however, did not require the
Eleventh Circuit to reverse the enhancement.5 1
As an initial matter, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the defendant
failed to object "to the lack of specificity of the court's findings at
sentencing or afterwards, and we have repeatedly outright declined to
entertain such a complaint for the first time on appeal."252 Regardless,
the Eleventh Circuit stated, the record demonstrated that "detailed
findings" would have been redundant and unnecessary.53 The Eleventh Circuit explained that the sentencing court acknowledged and

245. Id. "[S]pecific offense characteristics are delineated in Chapter Two" of the
Guidelines Manual.Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
246. Id.
247. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1.
248. See Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 938-39; Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1361.
249. See Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 938.
250. Id. (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993)).
251. See id. at 938-39.
252. Id. at 938.
253. Id. (quoting United States v. Hubert, 138 F.3d 912, 915 (11th Cir. 1998)).
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commented on several portions of the defendant's trial testimony, which
the government pointed out were "flatly contradicted by other witness
testimony and documentary evidence."254
The same obstruction enhancement was applied in Dougherty based
on the defendant's attempted escape from the county jail, where he was
held on state charges after his arrest in the federal case.2 5' The
commentary to § 3C1.1 lists attempted escape from custody before trial
or sentencing as an example of conduct covered by the enhancement, but
lists fleeing from arrest as an example of conduct that is not ordinarily
covered.256
In support of his argument that his attempt to flee only related to the
state charges and not to the federal case, the defendant pointed to
United States v.Alpert,257 where the en banc court reversed an obstruction enhancement that was based on the defendant's flight during
plea negotiations but before indictment.25 The Eleventh Circuit,
however, concluded that Alpert was not applicable. 9 Unlike the
defendant in Alpert, who fled before being indicted and incarcerated, the
defendant in Dougherty "was incarcerated and indicted before his escape
attempt."26 ° Stating that the "plain language" of the commentary
provided the enhancement applied to such conduct, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.261
VI.

ENHANCEMENTS BASED ON PRIOR CONVICTIONS

Prior convictions are a crucial component of all guideline calculations
because they determine the criminal history category262 for purposes
of the horizontal axis of the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part A of
the Guidelines Manual.63 Also, certain prior convictions can increase
the offense level on the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. 264 The
significance of prior convictions is vividly illustrated in drug, immigration, and firearm cases. For example, prior convictions for certain
controlled substance offenses and crimes of violence trigger the specific
offense characteristics for immigration and firearm offenses under
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 938-39.
Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1361.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 3C1.1

cmt. nn 4(E), 5(D).

28 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 1994).

258. Doughtery, 754 F.3d at 1361.

259. Id.
260. Id.

261. Id.
262. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A.
263. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A.
264.

See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. B.
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Chapter Two, Parts L and K of the Guidelines Manual,265 as well as
the Chapter Four career offender and armed career criminal enhancements that trump the Chapter Two Guidelines for certain drug, firearm,
and violent offenses. 2' Unsurprisingly, therefore, a substantial portion
of the 2014 precedential Eleventh Circuit decisions involved questions
about whether particular prior convictions qualified as predicate
controlled substance offenses or crimes of violence for purposes of those
enhancement provisions.
While the United States Supreme Court rarely decides Guidelines
issues, the Court regularly examines predicate offenses under the Armed

Career Criminal Act (the ACCA), 267 which dramatically increases the

statutory penalties for various firearm offenses if the defendant has at
least three prior convictions for a "violent felony" or "serious drug
offense."26 ' The definitions of those ACCA predicates are strikingly

similar to the definitions of the "crime of violence" and "controlled
substance offense" predicates for the Guidelines enhancements. 26 9 The
Eleventh Circuit thus uses the ACCA and Guidelines terms interchangeably and applies the Supreme Court precedent relating to the ACCA
predicates in determining which offenses qualify as crimes of violence
and controlled substance offenses under the Guidelines. 7 °
Enhancements for PriorDrug Convictions
The career offender guideline defines "controlled substance offense" as
an "offense under federal or state law," punishable by more than one

A.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2K2.1(a), 2L1.2(b).
266. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2, 4B1.4 (2014).
265.

267. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). Moreover, several statutes criminalizing drug, firearm,
and immigration offenses also include enhancements for similar prior convictions. See, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 851 (2012).
268. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); see also Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013);
Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133
(2010); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.
137 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13 (2005).
269. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL §§ 2K2.1
cmt. n.1, 2L1.2 cmt. n.l(B)(iii), (iv), 4B1.2.
270. See, e.g., United States v. Travis, 747 F.3d 1312, 1314 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014)
("Because the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides a definition of 'violent felony'
that is virtually identical to the definition of 'crime of violence' under the career offender
guideline, 'decisions about one apply to [the] other.'" (quoting Gilbert v. United States, 640
F.3d 1293, 1309 n.16 (11th Cir. 2011)); United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 820
n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that "[TIhe Eleventh Circuit has routinely employed the same
analytical framework" in the contexts of violent felonies under the ACCA and crimes of
violence under the guidelines).
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year of imprisonment, "that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance. . . or the possession
of a controlled substance... with intent to manufacture, import, export,
distribute, or dispense. " 7' Similarly, the ACCA defines a "serious drug
offense" as "an offense under State law," punishable by at least ten years
of imprisonment, 'Involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing
with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance."27 2 In
2014, the
Eleventh Circuit examined those definitions in consolidated
27 3
appeals.
Both defendants in United States v. Smith (Travis Smith)274 had
prior convictions for violating section 893.13(1) of the Florida Statutes,275 which prohibits selling, manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.
Based on those prior convictions, one defendant was sentenced as an
armed career criminal under the ACCA, and one defendant was
sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1. 1.276 In their consolidated
appeal, both defendants relied on Donawa v. United States Attorney
General277 to support their arguments that the Florida drug crimes did
not qualify as serious drug offenses for ACCA purposes or as controlled
substance offenses for career offender purposes because the Florida
Statute did not require mens rea regarding the nature of the controlled
substance.
In Donawa, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Florida drug offense did
not qualify as a "drug trafficking aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the INA). 279 In Travis Smith, however, the circuit court noted that the definitions of "serious drug offense"

271. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4B1.2(b).

272. 18 U.S.C. § 924(eX2)(A)(ii).
273. See United States v. Smith (Travis Smith), 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). This
case is referred to as Travis Smith to distinguish it from United States v. Smith (Flornoy
Smith), 742 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 2014), rehearing denied, 772 F.3d 680 (11th Cir. 2014),
which will be referred to as Flornoy Smith. See infra notes 349-60and accompanying text.
274. 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). For an explanation of why this case is referred to
as Travis Smith, see supra note 273.
275. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1) (West 2013).
276. Travis Smith, 775 F.3d at 1264-65.
277. 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013).
278. 775 F.3d 1266-67; see also Donowa, 735 F.3d at 1278. The Eleventh Circuit
declined to decide whether the defendants had properly preserved the issues, and thus
whether the issue was subject to de novo or plain error review, because the court concluded
that the District Court for the Southern District of Florida committed no error. Travis
Smith, 775 F.3d at 1266.
279. 735 F.3d at 1278; see also Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified in relevant
part at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(aX2XAXiii) (2014)).
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and "controlled substance offense" differ from the "drug trafficking"
definition.' The INA defines "drug trafficking" in reference to federal
drug crimes, which, in turn, require knowledge of the nature of the
substance." The ACCA and the career offender guideline, however,
simply refer to "certain activities related to controlled substances"
without explicitly or implicitly requiring mens rea.2 2 The Eleventh
is both
Circuit thus concluded, "Section 893.13(1) of the Florida Statutes
' "2
a 'serious drug offense' and a 'controlled substance offense. 1
B. Enhancements for PriorCrime of Violence Convictions
Like the ACCA definition of "violent felony," the three-part "crime of
violence" definition in the career offender and firearm Guidelines
includes an element clause, enumerated offenses, and a residual
clause.2 ' The definition in the immigration Guideline contains the

280. 775 F.3d at 1267.
281. See id.
282. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as
"an offense under State law, punishable by at least ten years of imprisonment, involving
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(AXii)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court also explained that the career offender guideline defines a "controlled
substance offense" as "any offense under state law, punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing
of a controlled substance ... or the possession of a controlled substance... with intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
283. Id. at 1268 (citations omitted).
284. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a), 2K2.1. Section 4B1.2(a)
defines "crimes of violence" for purposes of the career offender guideline as follows:
lAlny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a). The firearm guideline also relies on this
definition. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1.

The ACCA defines a "violent felony" as follows:
[Any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any
act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or
destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if
committed by an adult, that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another; or
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same element clause, more enumerated offenses, and no residual
clause.2 85

In recent years, significant Supreme Court decisions have "unsettled"
Eleventh Circuit precedent concerning whether various offenses qualify
6
under one or more of these parts of the "crime of violence" definition.1
In 2014, the Supreme Court decision with the greatest impact on
Eleventh Circuit precedent was Descamps v. United States, 28 7 which
clarified how and when to use the "modified categorical approach," as
opposed to the "categorical approach," in analyzing whether a particular
offense qualifies as a violent felony.2s The Eleventh Circuit extensively discussed Descamps in several cases, explaining its impact on the
analytical framework.289
If the statutory elements of the particular offense "are such that every
conviction for violating that statute qualifies as a crime of violence, then
the offense is categorically a crime of violence." 290 If, on the other hand,
the statute includes multiple offenses, some with and some without
violent elements, the analysis is more complicated.2 9' Before proceed-

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another....
18 U.S.C. § 924(eX2XB).
285. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt n.1(BXiii). The immigration
Guideline commentary defines "crimes of violence" as follows:
lAlny of the following offenses under federal, state, or local law: murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including
where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where
consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape,
sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,
burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under federal, state, or local law that
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.l(B)(iii).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2014) (revisiting
the "settled law" of United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir. 2010), which
became "unsettled by the Supreme Court's recent decision"); United States v. Petite, 703
F.3d 1290, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that Sykes abrogated Eleventh Circuit precedent
concerning whether simple fleeing and eluding was a crime of violence);United States v.
Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that Begay abrogated Eleventh
Circuit precedent that held the Florida offense of carrying a concealed weapon was a crime
of violence).
287. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
288. Id. at 2293.
289. See, e.g., Howard, 742 F.3d 1334; Estrella,758 F.3d 1239; see also Cakmis, supra
note 1, at 997.
290. Cakmis, supra note 1, at 997.
291. See id.
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ing to the "modified categorical approach," the court must first determine
whether the statute is divisible, as opposed to being overbroad and
indivisible. 29 2 A statute is divisible if it contains multiple alternative
elements, and the jury must find the element charged in a particular
case unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. 29' A statute is
indivisible if it does not require that the verdict be based on "one
alternative as opposed to the other[.]"294 The modified categorical
approach only applies to divisible statutes."
Under the modified categorical approach, the court must determine
whether the particular offense was based on the violent or non-violent
element of an offense. 9 6 In so doing, the sentencing court may consider
charging documents, written plea agreements, plea colloquy transcripts,
and explicit factual findings made by the trial judge and assented to by
the defendant-commonly called "Shepard-documents" in reference to
Shepard v. United States. 97
1. Element Clause.
The identical element clause in the immigration and career offender guidelines, as well as the ACCA, includes any
offense that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another."29 Methodically
applying each step of the "crime of violence" analysis under Descamps,
the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Estrella29 ' that wantonly
or maliciously throwing, hurling, or projecting a missile, stone, or other
hard substance at an occupied vehicle, in violation of § 790.19 of the

292. Estrella, 758 F.3d at 1245-46. That task "maybe difficult sometimes." Id. at 1246.
As explained in Estrella,"A sentencing court, to be sure, can hypothetically reconceive [an
indivisible] statute in divisible terms." Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Descamps, 133
S. Ct. at 2290).
293. Id. at 1245-46.
294. Id. at 1246.
295. See Cakmis, supra note 1, at 997.
296. Id.
297. Id.; see also Shepard,544 U.S. 13 (2005); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.

575 (1990).
298. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(aXl); see 18 U.S.C. § 924(ex2)(B)(i).
299. 758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014).
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Florida30 1Statutes, 30 0 is not a crime of violence under the element
clause.
Parsing the Florida statute, the Eleventh Circuit focused on two
elements: the type of structure targeted and the mens rea 3 0 2 The
statute lists several types of "structures," including an occupied or
unoccupied building, a vehicle being used or occupied by a person, and
a vessel or aircraft. 30 8 "Based upon what Descamps teaches us," the
Eleventh Circuit concluded, § 790.19 is divisible because "it is clear from
the face of the statute that each of these different structures is a
separate element." 4 The court thus invoked the modified categorical
approach to examine whether force directed at the particular structure
underlying the prior conviction in Estrella- "a vehicle being used or
occupied by a person" -fell within the element clause of the crime of
violence definition.' ° 5
The element clause requires the force to be directed "against the
person of another," as opposed to property crimes. 306 By requiring that
the force be directed at an occupied vehicle, § 790.19 includes force
3 0°7
against property, which is outside the scope of the element clause
Given that the statute does not divide the element further, such that the
property is the target of one offense and the person is the target of
another offense, the court concluded that § 790.19 does not qualify as a
crime of violence under the element clause.308

300. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.19 (West 2007). That statute provides:

Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile
or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death
or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or
unoccupied, or public or private bus or any train, locomotive, railway car, caboose,
cable railway car, street railway car, monorail car, or vehicle of any kind which
is being used or occupied by any person, or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying
in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this
state shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree....
Id.
301. Estrella, 758 F.3d at 1254.
302. See id. at 1248, 1253.
303. FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 790.19.

304. Estrella, 758 F.3d at 1249.
305. Id.

306. Id. at 1248.
307. Id. at 1251-52 ("Where an element would permit conviction whenever the defen-

dant targets property that happens to be occupied, that element is 'akin to criminal
damage to property,' and covers conduct broader than the crimes against persons to which
the [element clause appl[ies]." (quoting United States v. Curtis, 645 F.3d 937,942 (7th Cir.

2011) (citations omitted)).
308. Id. at 1252-53.
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Additionally, the court observed that the mens rea element in § 790.19
is divisible inasmuch as it includes intent to damage property as an
alternative to intent to harm a person."' The Shepard-documents,
however, did not indicate which alternative mental state formed the
basis of the defendant's conviction. 1 ° The court therefore was required
to assume that the defendant was only convicted of using force directed
against property because that is "the least of the acts criminalized."'
Accordingly, the court held that the prior Florida conviction for throwing
a deadly missile at an occupied vehicle did not qualify for the crime of
violence enhancement under the element clause.312 Nor is that offense
enumerated in the crime of violence definition.3 13 And since the crime
of violence definition in immigration guideline has no residual clause,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing," 4
The second part of the crime of violence
2. Enumerated Offenses.
definition enumerates specific offenses that are always crimes of
violence. 15 Four offenses are enumerated in the career offender
guideline and the ACCA: burglary, arson, extortion, and offenses
involving use of explosives. 1 6 The immigration guideline adds several
offenses including "forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the
conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the
conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, [and]
sexual abuse of a minor.... 1,317
Given that these offenses are specified, the "enumerated offenses" part
of the crime of violence definition would appear, at first glance, to be the
simplest part to apply. But appearances can be deceiving. In 2014, the
Eleventh Circuit analyzed prior convictions under Alabama, Florida, and
South Carolina burglary statutes in United States v. Howard,31 s

309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1254.
Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013)).
Id.

313.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2.

314. Estrella, 758 F.3d at 1254.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2).
316. 18 U.S.C. § 924(eX2)(BXii) (enumerating "burglary, arson, or extortion, involves
use of explosives"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (enumerating the
same offenses with the only difference being that the guideline refers to "burglary of a
dwelling").
317. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(BXiii).
318. 742 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing de novo a preserved challenge to a
burglary conviction under section 13A-7-7 of the Alabama Code, ALA. CODE § 13A-7-7
(LexisNexis 2005)).
315.
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3 2 ° and
United States v. Jones,319 United States v. Ramirez-Flores,
United States v. Kirk.32 '
As explained in Howard, "not just any burglary will do." 322 Different
statutes define "burglary" differently.3 23 The title of the statute,
therefore, cannot automatically confer "enumerated offense" status on a
prior burglary conviction. 324 Rather, the enhancements only apply to
offenses that fall within "the generic, contemporary meaning of
burglary."3 25 Burglary thus defined "contains at least the following
elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a
building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime."326
In Kirk, the Eleventh Circuit accepted as undisputed that the
defendant's prior burglary conviction under § 810.02(lXb) of the Florida
Statutes32 7 did not qualify under the enumerated offenses part of the
violent felony definition because "Florida's definition of burglary is
broader [than] the definition of generic burglary."3 The court thus
only applied the residual329clause in ruling that the Florida burglary
offense is a violent felony.
The Alabama third-degree burglary statute at issue in Howard, on the
other hand, was analyzed at length, beginning with the pre-Descamps
precedent holding that a conviction under that statute could qualify as
a violent felony predicate. 330 Based on the Descamps ruling, the court
changed course in Howard.331 First, the court determined that the
Alabama statute is non-generic because its definition of "building"

319. 743 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying plain error review to the same Alabama
statute reviewed in Howard).
320. 743 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying plain error review to a challenge to a
burglary conviction under section 16-11-312(A) of the South Carolina Code, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-312(A) (2003)).
321. 767 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2014) (relying on the parties' agreement that the
defendant's prior burglary conviction under section 810.02(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02(1)(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015), did not quaify under the
enumerated offenses part of the violent felony definition because "Florida's defimition of
burglary is broader [than] the definition of generic burglary," but holding that the offense
still qualified under the residual clause).
322. 742 F.3d at 1342.
323. See Kirk, 767 F.3d at 1139 n.1.
324. See Howard, 742 F.3d at 1342.
325. Id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598).
326. Id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598).
327. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02(lXb) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
328. Kirk, 767 F.3d at 1139 n.1.
329. Id. at 1139 n.1, 1141.
330. See Howard, 742 F.3d at 1338.
331. See id. at 1345-47 (detailing the analytical process in light of Descamps).
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includes more than the generic definition of "building or structure."3 2
The court then concluded that the statute is not divisible because it does
not provide alternative offenses. 3 Consequently, the court held that
a prior conviction under that statute could not qualify as an enumerated
offense.'
The same Alabama burglary statute was at issue in Jones, but the
defendant in Jones failed to preserve the issue, thereby relegating it to
plain error review. 33 5 Howard established that the error in Jones was
plain because Howard was decided six days before Jones and was
squarely on point.3 36 Unfortunately for the defendant in RamirezFlores, the court had not previously reviewed the South Carolina
burglary statute under which he was convicted in light of Descamps.337
Without "definitively decid[ing] that the South Carolina statute at issue
is divisible," the court disposed of the case, concluding that "it is not
plain or obvious that the statute is indivisible."
In addition to burglary, the Eleventh Circuit addressed "sexual abuse
of a minor" and "forcible sex offenses," which are only enumerated in the
"crime of violence" definition in the immigration guideline. 339 The court
ruled in United States v. Ramirez-Gonzale 34° that the specific elements of the Georgia offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes fit
within the "broad generic definition of 'sexual abuse of a minor' that
includes both physical and nonphysical misuse and maltreatment of a
minor for the purposes of sexual gratification.""
In United States v. Contreras," the Eleventh Circuit held that
Florida's second degree sexual battery offense-which does not require
"any force or violence beyond the force and violence that is inherent in
the accomplishment of penetration or union" 3-qualified as a "forcible

332. Id. at 1348.
333. See id. at 1348-49.
334. See id. at 1349.
335. 743 F.3d at 828.
336. Id. at 829-30.
337. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 822-23.
338. Id. at 823.
339. See United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 2014);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(Biii) (listing"forcible sex offenses

(including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where
consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual
abuse of a minor" in the definition of crime of violence).
340. 755 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2014).
341. Id. at 1272.
342. 739 F.3d 592 (11th Cir. 2014).
343. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.005 (West 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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sex offense." 3 " The court based its ruling on the language of the
guideline that "forcible sex offenses" include offenses "where consent to
the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to
the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced."3 5 For purposes
of the immigration guideline, therefore, "forcible sexual offenses" include
sexual offenses that do not require "force."
The third and final part of the "crime of
3. Residual Clause.
violence" definition-the residual clause-includes any offense that
"otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another." ' The recent jurisprudence concerning
whether fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer is a
violent felony illustrates the unsettled state of the residual clause.
In 2009, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Florida offense of "simple
vehicle flight" from a law enforcement officer, without driving recklessly
or at a high speed, was not a violent felony. 4 7 In 2013, however, the
court held that intervening Supreme Court jurisprudence abrogated that
precedent, and therefore even "simple vehicle flight" is a crime of
violence.3 4 8 The court then expanded that ruling in an unpublished
opinion in United States v. Smith (Flornoy Smith),3" where the court
suggested that even fleeing from law enforcement on foot is a violent
felony under the residual clause. 350 The Supreme Court, however,
granted certiorari, vacated the Eleventh Circuit decision in Flornoy
Smith, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Descamps.3 5
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed, concluding, "based
on the text of the Florida statute and other authorities, [Florida law]
prohibits vehicular flight, but, in any event, fleeing and eluding a law
enforcement officer, whether on foot or in a vehicle, is categorically a
violent felony."35" The subsequent denial of rehearing en banc353

344. Contreras, 739 F.3d at 595.
345. Id. at 594-95 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2L1.2 cmt. n.1

(BXili)).
346. 18 U.S.C. § 924(eX2)(BXii); see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2).
347. See generally United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
348. See Petite, 703 F.3d at 1299 (holding that Harrisonhad been abrogated by Sykes);
see also Cakmis, supra note 1, at 1002-03.
349. 518 F. App'x 774 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also supra note 273.
350. 518 F. App'x at 775.
351. Smith v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 258 (2013).
352. FlornoySmith, 742 F.3d at 953, 955; see also Travis, 747 F.3d at 1317 (upholding
a Guideline enhancement based on the Florida offense of vehicular flight).
353.

Flornoy Smith, 772 F.3d 680.
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sparked a detailed dissent concerning the convoluted history of the case
and evolution of the "violent felony" law regarding flight from law
enforcement.3 ' The defendant is again seeking Supreme Court intervention.355
Although the residual clause has been widely criticized,3 56 the
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected arguments that it is void for
vagueness. 7 In an interesting turn of events, however, the Supreme
Court is currently considering that argument.35 The Supreme Court
originally granted certiorari in United States v. Johnson,59 to decide
whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony
under the ACCA."6 ° Two months after hearing argument on that issue,
the Supreme Court sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing and reargument on whether the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague,
even though the parties had not briefed that issue."'
4. Post-Conviction Ramifications. This evolving jurisprudence
also has impacted post-conviction law, which is evolving as well, For
example, when the defendant in Spencer v. United States3 62 was
sentenced, his prior conviction for the Florida offense of felony child
abuse 63 was deemed a crime of violence for purposes of the career
offender enhancement. 3 4 After the Supreme Court decided Begay v.

354. See id. at 681-82 (Martin, J., dissenting).
355. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Smith v. United States, No. 14-8464 (Feb. 13,
2015).
356. See, e.g., Sykes, 131 S.Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chambers, 555 U.S. at
132 (Alito, J., concurring).
357. See, e.g., Travis, 747 F.3d at 1314 n.1; see also Cakmis, supra note 1, at 1000
n.248.
358. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 939 (2015) (order restoring case to
calendar).
359. 526 F. App'x 708 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. Apr. 21,
2014) (No. 13-7120).
360. See Brief for the Petitioner, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (June 26,
2014); cf. United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that
possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun is not a violent felony under the ACCA
based on the test set forth in Begay).
361. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 939.
362. 727 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a defendant who unsuccessfully
challenged his career offender status at sentencing and on direct appeal can use a timelyfiled first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) to pursue the same issue when an
intervening case from the Supreme Court validates his argument and applies retroactively).
363. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2015).
364. See United States v. Spencer, 271 F. App'x 977, 979 (11th Cir. 2008).
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United States,365 the defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,366 challenging his career offender sentence.367 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the denial of post-conviction
relief in 2013 after determining that felony child abuse, as defined in
Florida, is not a crime of violence in light of recent Supreme Court
precedent.36 8
In 2014, however, the panel decision in Spencer was vacated, and the
case was reheard en banc. 36 s Even though the government agreed that
Florida's felony child abuse crime was not a crime of violence, 370 a
sharply divided en banc court affirmed the denial of the post-conviction
motion without deciding whether Florida's felony child abuse is a crime
of violence.37 1 Instead, the en banc court essentially held that guideline
decisions cannot be challenged post-conviction unless the predicate
offense has been vacated since sentencing or the sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum.372
VII.

DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES

In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit decisions relating to variances and
departures from the Guideline range remained consistent with previous
years.373 In particular, the court rejected every challenge to the
substantive reasonableness of sentences within and above the Guideline
range, including sentences of life imprisonment. 374 The court, however,
reversed the below-range sentence in United States v. Hayes37v as

365. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
366. 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
367. Spencer, 727 F.3d at 1080-81.

368. Id. at 1100.
369. See Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2014).

370. See id. at 1152 (Martin, J., dissenting).
371. See id. at 1140, 1144.
372. See id. at 1140-44.
373. See Cakmis, supra note 1, at 1007-12.
374. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 772 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (lth Cir. 2014)
(affirming 240-month sentence, which was below the statutory maximum, but above the
Guideline range of 78 to 97 months); Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1357, 1361-64 (affirming 428month sentence for the defendant who only raised a substantive reasonableness challenge,
while reversing the same sentence for the other two defendants who challenged the
Guideline calculations); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1288-91 (11th Cir. 2014)
(affirming life sentence for child sex trafficking and producing child pornography); United
States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268, 1271-72, 1282 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming 1062-month
sentence as reasonable).
375. 762 F.3d 1300 (l1th Cir. 2014).
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substantively unreasonable.37 Perhaps the only remarkable thing
about these decisions is the lengthy dissent in Hayes, which points out:
Because it invited the procedural error, which, in turn, led to the
complained-of substantive error, the "invited error doctrine" precludes
the Government from prevailing in this appeal. Yet the court fails to
acknowledge that a procedural error has occurred. Instead, it assesses
the substantive reasonableness of Hayes's procedurally flawed sentence-something the Supreme Court prohibits-and thereby avoids the
need to grapple with the Government's invited error. I dissent from the
court's failure to invoke the doctrine and to send the Government
hence without day[sic]. 3"
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit left many issues undecided or not fully
addressed based on procedural barriers to appellate review. Notwithstanding, the court resolved issues of first impression concerning various
Guideline enhancements and revisited its precedent regarding other
enhancements. While most Eleventh Circuit precedent remains intact,
Supreme Court decisions have abrogated some precedent. Given the
constantly evolving Guidelines that significantly enhance sentences, it
is unlikely that the court will face a shortage of Guidelines challenges
next year.

376. Id. at 1302, 1306.
377. Id. at 1311 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).

C.,

